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Free Licensing in a Differentiated Duopoly 
 
Abstract: The present paper discusses the possibility of free licensing in a model of differentiated 
duopoly. We have shown that given the market size, the degree of product differentiation and the 
unit cost of input production, free licensing will occur if the transferred technology is not much 
superior and the market price of input is sufficiently large. If, however, any of market size, input 
cost or product substitution goes up, the possibility of free licensing will fall. Our result has an 
important implication in the context of transboundary pollution. The overall welfare under free 
licensing will be higher unambiguously.  
Keywords: Transferred technology, free licensing, product differentiation, input price, cross-
border pollution. 
JEL Classification: D43; D45; L13; L24. 
 
1. Introduction 
Technology licensing is a common phenomenon in industries. A firm owning a superior 
production technology licenses its technology to another firm initially holding relatively backward 
technologies. Technology transfer reduces the licensee’s cost of production or improves the quality 
of the product. If the transferor is a non-producing firm or it does not compete in the transferee’s 
market after technology transfer takes place, then such a transfer is always feasible to the extent 
that it enhances the transferee’s profit. In such a situation the problem of the transferor is to design 
a contract so as to extract maximum possible surplus. On the other hand, if the licensor and the 
licensee compete in the same market place, technology licensing reduces the operational profit of 
the licensor. Then, technology licensing may take place provided that the licensee can fully 
compensate for the loss of payoff of the licensor. The literature on technology licensing discusses, 
among other things, the optimal licensing contracts.1 Typically, licensing takes place against a 
payment by the licensee in the form of a fixed fee and/or royalty. There is also a literature that 
shows that sometimes technology licensing results in an upward shift of the market demand. This 
further counters the negative effect of technology transfer on the transferor’s profit. For instance, 
in Shepard (1987), licensing induces quality competition, and this acts as quality commitment that 
 
1 On optimal licensing contracts one may look at some selected works like Kabiraj (2004), Sen and Tauman (2007), 
Erutku and Richelle (2007), Lee and Kabiraj (2011), Sinha (2016), Kabiraj and Kabiraj (2017), Liu and Tauman 
(2019), and Mukherjee (2020). 
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increases industry demand. Similarly, in Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2008), licensing of a quality-
improving innovation directly affects consumers’ preferences and their willingness to pay for the 
product. They have studied the problem in a logit demand framework and have shown that the 
optimal licensing contract depends on whether the market is fully covered or not, and whether the 
consumers’ heterogeneity is sufficiently large.  
Then a natural question that comes up is: Can free licensing of technology to a rival be profitable? 
This question is not without any context; it has important implication to some real-life problems. 
For example, consider the problem of cross-border pollution. In the literature of environmental 
economics, one important debated issue relates to the cross-border pollution generated from 
production of final goods. It is often complained by the developed countries that developing 
countries, which generally produce goods and services using backward technologies, generate 
pollution to such an extent that not only the country of origin is adversely affected but, in fact, all 
other countries are similarly affected by the cross-border movement of pollutants. After all, 
production by backward technologies damage the atmosphere, air space and waterbody by means 
of emitting carbon, gaseous pollutants and other obnoxious chemicals and particles.2 The 
developing countries, in turn, ask the developed countries to transfer their superior technologies 
freely and the associated inputs at a subsidized price so that the overall pollution generation 
becomes least, and this in turn benefits the developed countries as well. There are several studies 
that show that pollution in one country can have serious environmental consequences in others. 
Reducing global pollution and warming-up requires increased cooperation among the nations of 
both developed and developing countries. This cooperation should include, to the extent possible, 
the right of access to environment friendly technologies by all others (e.g., see Jeffery (1992) and 
West (2020)). 
Similarly, one may find implications of free licensing in the context of music industry. It is shown 
by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) that the music industry may benefit by allowing free downloading 
to music consumers. This is indeed the case when consumers’ taste heterogeneity and product 
diversity are sufficiently large. Here the industry gains from file-sharing networks. Note that free 
licensing of innovations in the computer software industry is also common. However, free and 
 
2
 See Keresztesi et al. (2020) and the references therein. 
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open source software appears to be close to sharing of knowledge and cooperation in research. A 
very comprehensive and insightful study on this issue is found in Lerner and Tirole (2002). 
In the present paper we construct a differentiated duopoly model with quantity competition when 
initially one firm holds a superior production technology which, if transferred, will save resources 
of the transferee, and hence reduce unit production cost. Further, the licensor sells inputs to the 
licensee compatible with the production technology. Although by sharing its production 
knowledge the licensor creates competition from the licensee, but the former’s loss of profit due 
to competition may be outweighed by the revenue it earns from the sale of inputs to the competitor, 
hence free licensing of a superior technology may be mutually beneficial. Before we go to the 
model and results, we first briefly discuss the existing literature on free licensing. This will help 
the readers place our paper properly in the literature. 
There are only a few works, in the literature, that discuss the possibility of free licensing, that is, 
the case when technology is transferred free of cost; still it is a rational decision on the part of the 
transferor which wants to maximize its overall payoff. The existing literature focuses mostly on 
network externalities and the shift of market demand for the product. We have already mentioned 
the work of Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006).  Among others, Conner (1995) analyzes the benefits of 
market expansion from licensing and derives conditions for which it is profitable for an incumbent 
to license its technology for free to an entrant who uses the licensed technology to introduce its 
own product and compete in the incumbent’s market. The paper suggests that innovator’s best 
strategy may be to encourage clones of its products when a network externality is present. Then 
Boivin and Langinier (2005) extend the analysis to examine whether free licensing can be 
profitable even in a homogeneous good duopoly setting. The paper explicitly assumes that the 
structure of the market influences the market demand. In particular, consumers’ willingness to pay 
for a product is larger when it is duopoly than when it is monopoly. Thus, the paper assumes that 
licensing results in an upward shift of the market demand function. The increase in demand 
resulting from licensing can be large enough to induce the incumbent to share its technology.  
In contrast, in our paper there is neither network externality nor market demand shift effect. 
Moreover, pre-licensing situation is also a duopoly. So, licensing of a superior production 
technology to a rival will intensify competition in the product market and reduce the licensor’s 
payoff from market competition depending on the degree of substitution between the products sold 
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by them. Since we assume that the licensor can supply the relevant input at a cheaper rate than the 
market price, therefore the rival will buy the input from the licensor. So, when the superior 
production technology is transferred, revenue from input sale must have to outweigh the loss from 
product market competition. The interesting feature of our model is that although the licensor sells 
inputs at a price higher than the input cost of production, but the input demand of the licensee may 
increase or decrease in the post-licensing situation. The reason is that under the transferred 
technology input requirement per unit of output is reduced. Therefore, the revenue from input sale 
may go up or fall, and the loss of profit from the product market competition will depend on the 
degree of product differentiability. First of all, we have shown that there cannot be any free 
licensing technology if the products they produce are homogeneous. Then given that the products 
are not perfect substitutes to each other, free licensing of technology can occur only if the 
transferred technology is not much superior and the licensor can sell inputs at a sufficiently high 
price, that is, the input market is critically imperfect. The reason is that a much superior transferred 
technology will reduce the licensor’s operating profit to a significant amount, and unless input 
price is high enough, additional revenue from input sale will not be sufficient to compensate for 
the loss of profit. If the input production cost increases or the degree of product substitution rises, 
it is natural that free licensing is more difficult to occur. But interestingly, we see that an increase 
in market size also reduces the possibility of free licensing. 
There are a number of papers dealing with licensing in a differentiated goods model (e.g., see 
Wang and Yang (1999), Mukherjee and Balasubramanian (2001), Wang (2002), and Bagchi and 
Mukherjee (2014)). Our paper, however, differs from those in various respects. First, those papers 
consider technology transfer under a fee or royalty contract (or under two-part tariff contracts), 
whereas we consider licensing completely free of cost. Second, in our paper the licensor has two 
sources of profits, viz., profits from product market operation and also from input sale. Third, in 
those papers in the post-licensing situation the licensor and the licensee have generally symmetric 
costs of production. In our paper superior technology reduces input requirements per unit of final 
good production, but even after licensing the cost asymmetry between the firms prevails, although 
the gap is reduced. Generally, a larger market size increases the possibility of licensing. In our 
paper, possibility of free licensing gets reduced.  
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There are some works (e.g., Mukherjee (2019) and Mukherjee et al. (2009)) which although do 
not discuss free licensing but can be implicated. These papers show that there are situations when 
entry of a new firm in the industry can benefit the incumbent(s). The papers show that entry in the 
product market has its effect in the input market, that results in lowering input price for the 
incumbents. Contrarily, in our paper licening occurs in between the product market competitors, 
and it has no effect on the input price. However, licensing increases input sale of the licensor, 
hence its revenue from input sale goes up.    
Finally, we have derived welfare implications of our results. We have shown that under free 
licensing, not only consumers’ surplus and industry profit go up, but also under some conditions 
the overall pollution level goes down.  
The layout of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we present the model and results of the 
paper, then Section 3 concludes the paper. Some proofs are relegated in the appendix. 
 
2. Model 
Consider a differentiated duopoly. Two firms produce differentiated products and compete in 
quantities. Let 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 be the quantities produced by firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. The market 
demand as faced by firm 𝑖 is given by  𝑃𝑖 = 𝑎 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑏𝑞𝑗,      𝑖 ≠ 𝑗; 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 
where 𝑃𝑖 is the price of product 𝑖, and 𝑎 > 0 is the common demand parameter, representing 
market size. Finally, 𝑏 measures the degree of substitution between the products such that 𝑏 =  0 
means two products are independent (so zero substitution) and 𝑏 =  1 means two products are 
perfectly homogeneous; hence we assume 𝑏 ∈ (0, 1). 
Initially, the firms have the same production technology, that is, each product requires one unit of 
one common input. Firm 1 can produce this input at a cost of 𝑐 > 0 per unit, whereas the input is 
also available in the market at a price 𝑟; 𝑐 < 𝑟 < 𝑎. Hence firm 1 can sell the input to firm 2 at a 
limit price, 𝑟. For simplicity, we assume that no other inputs are required for production. Hence 
initially, firm 1 has a unit cost 𝑐 per unit of its output and firm 2’s unit cost of production is  𝑟.    
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Now let us assume that before the game starts, firm 1 comes up with an innovation that reduces its 
input requirement to 𝑚 per unit of output; 0 < 𝑚 < 1. Then firm 1 has an option to license its 
superior technology to firm 2. In this paper we consider free licensing if licensing is to occur, and 
free licensing will occur if it is profitable. Then under no licensing situation firm 1’s unit cost of 
production will be 𝑚𝑐 and that of firm 2 will be 𝑟. However, if licensing occurs, their unit costs 
of production will be, respectively, 𝑚𝑐 and 𝑚𝑟. Below we first consider no-licensing equilibrium, 
and then examine the possibility of free licensing under the initial assumptions: 
 (A1)         𝑎 > 𝑟 > 𝑐 > 0, 0 < 𝑏 < 1 and 0 < 𝑚 < 1 
 
2.1 No licensing 
Under no licensing situation, the profit functions of firm 1 and firm 2 are respectively, Π1 = [(𝑎 − 𝑚𝑐) − 𝑞1 − 𝑏𝑞2]𝑞1 + (𝑟 − 𝑐)𝑞2                                      (1a) Π2 = [(𝑎 − 𝑟) − 𝑞2 − 𝑏𝑞1]𝑞2                                                              (1b) 
Then their profit maximizing outputs can be solved from the two first order conditions, 𝜕Π𝑖𝜕𝑞𝑖 =0, 𝑖 = 1, 2. The unique equilibrium outputs of the firms will be,3 𝑞1𝑛 = (2−𝑏)𝑎−2𝑚𝑐+𝑏𝑟4−𝑏2                                                                                 (2a) 𝑞2𝑛 = (2−𝑏)𝑎−2𝑟+𝑏𝑚𝑐4−𝑏2                                                                                (2b)                                         
where the subscript 𝑛 denotes no-licensing. Since we assume initial duopoly, we must need to 
satisfy that  𝑞2𝑛 > 0 , i.e., 
 (A2)      2𝑟 <  (2 − 𝑏)𝑎 +  𝑏𝑚𝑐, i.e.,  𝑟 <  (2−𝑏)𝑎 + 𝑏𝑚𝑐2 ≡  ?̅?(𝑚).4  
Therefore, in equilibrium the no-licensing payoffs of the firms are  Π1𝑛 =  𝑞1𝑛2 + (𝑟 − 𝑐)𝑞2𝑛                                                                       (3a) 
 
3
 Note that the second order and uniqueness conditions are satisfied. 
4
 Note that ?̅?(𝑚) < 𝑎 true for all  𝑚 ∈ [0, 1]. 
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 Π2𝑛 = 𝑞2𝑛2                                                                                               (3b) 
 
2.2 Free Licensing 
We first derive the quantities and payoffs of the firms if free licensing occurs. Then we find 
conditions under which free licensing will occur. Free licensing will be profitable if under free 
licensing the licensor’s profit is strictly higher than the no-licensing payoff and the licensee is not 
worse off. 
Under free licensing firm 1 and firm 2 will maximize respectively the following profit expressions: Π1 = [(𝑎 − 𝑚𝑐) − 𝑞1 − 𝑏𝑞2]𝑞1 + 𝑚(𝑟 − 𝑐)𝑞2                                      (4a) Π2 = [(𝑎 − 𝑚𝑟) − 𝑞2 − 𝑏𝑞1]𝑞2                                                             (4b) 
Solving the above maximization problems, we derive the equilibrium quantities to be produced 
under free licensing by firm 1 and firm 2, given by 𝑞1𝑓 = (2−𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑚𝑐+𝑏𝑚𝑟4−𝑏2                                                                           (5a) 𝑞2𝑓 = (2−𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑚𝑟+𝑏𝑚𝑐4−𝑏2                                                                           (5b) 
and the payoffs under equilibrium are Π1𝑓 =  𝑞1𝑓2 + 𝑚(𝑟 − 𝑐)𝑞2𝑓                                                                    (6a) 
             Π2𝑓 =  𝑞2𝑓2                                                                                              (6b) 
Then comparing (2) and (5), we can immediately see that 
                𝑞1𝑓 < 𝑞1𝑛 ,   𝑞2𝑓 > 𝑞2𝑛                                                                               (7) 
that is, under free licensing firm 1’s output falls and firm 2’s increases. The simple reason is that 
under licensing production knowledge is shared; as a result, firm 2 uses the same superior 
technology, hence its cost of production falls compared to no-licensing situation. Then given (7), 
comparing (3) and (6) we have Π2𝑓 >  Π2𝑛, that is, firm 2’s profit under licensing goes up. 
However, firm 1’s overall profit may or may not increase; therefore, free licensing may or may 
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not be profitable. The reason is that firm 1’s operational profit falls certainly, i.e., 𝑞1𝑓2 <  𝑞1𝑛2  ,  but 
its volume of input sales to firm 2 is ambiguous, because 𝑞2𝑓 > 𝑞2𝑛, but 𝑚 < 1 so that 𝑚𝑞2𝑓  ><  𝑞2𝑛.5 Even when the volume of input sales goes up, its increased revenue from input sale 
may not be large enough to overcompensate the loss of operational profit.    
Therefore, given assumptions (A1) and (A2), free licensing will occur if and only if (Π1𝑓 − Π1𝑛) > 0. In the next section we shall derive the conditions under which free licensing will be 
profitable. In our analysis we focus on the role of two parameters, 𝑚 and 𝑟, that is, the parameters 
for production technology and the input market competition, respectively. Hence, we take the 
parameters 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑐 as fixed, and then examine for which combination of 𝑚 and 𝑟 free licensing 
will be profitable. Finally, we study the effect of a change of 𝑎, 𝑏 or 𝑐 on the critical values of 𝑚 
and 𝑟.  
 
2.3 Conditions for Free Licensing        
We have already shown that given assumptions (A1) and (A2), free licensing will be profitable if 
and only if (Π1𝑓 −  Π1𝑛) > 0. Now, Π1𝑓 −  Π1𝑛 = (𝑟 − 𝑐)(𝑚𝑞2𝑓 − 𝑞2𝑛) − (𝑞1𝑛2 −  𝑞1𝑓2 ) 
Hence, Π1𝑓 −  Π1𝑛 =  (1−𝑚)[(4−𝑏2)(𝑟−𝑐){2𝑟(1+𝑚)−(2−𝑏)𝑎−𝑏𝑚𝑐} − 𝑏𝑟{2(2−𝑏)𝑎− 4𝑚𝑐+𝑏𝑟(1+𝑚)}](4 − 𝑏2)2      =  (1−𝑚)(4 − 𝑏2)2 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)                                                                            (8) 
where 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  = [(4 − 𝑏2)(𝑟 − 𝑐){2𝑟(1 + 𝑚) − (2 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑏𝑚𝑐}  
                                                              − 𝑏𝑟{2(2 − 𝑏)𝑎 −  4𝑚𝑐 + 𝑏𝑟(1 + 𝑚)}]                                   
 
5 𝑚𝑞2𝑓 − 𝑞2𝑛 = (1−𝑚)[2𝑟 (1+𝑚)−(2−𝑏)𝑎−𝑏𝑚𝑐]4−𝑏2  
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  Then,  Π1𝑓 −  Π1𝑛 > 0 ⟺ 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟) > 0 for all 𝑚 ∈ [0, 1)                          (9) 
Immediately, as a special case, we have the following two results. 
Proposition 1: Free licensing is never profitable if the products are perfect substitute to each other 
(i.e., 𝑏 =  1). 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
In Appendix 1 we have shown that 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  <  0 when  𝑏 =  1, hence free licensing is not 
profitable if the products are homogeneous. The reason is that if the products are homogeneous, 
the fierce competition will reduce firm 1’s operational profit substantially, making the overall 
profit to fall. 
Proposition 2: If the products are independent (i.e., 𝑏 =  0), free licensing is profitable if and 
only if  𝑎 < 𝑟(1 + 𝑚). 
Proof: See Appendix 2. 
The proposition states that when the degree of substitution between the products is zero, free 
licensing will not be profitable unless the market size is below a critical level, or the transferred 
technology must not be very much efficient. The intuition is the following. Since products are 
independent, so there is no competition, hence firm 1’s output and operational profit will remain 
unchanged. But total input sale to firm 2 may or may not go up. If technology is very superior (that 
is, 𝑚 is small enough), effectively input sale to firm 2 will fall, hence revenue from input sale will 
also fall. 
Before we derive the main results of the paper, the following results are helpful regarding the 
behavior of 𝐻(. ) function.  
Proposition 3: Given (A1), for any (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) and 𝑟 = ?̅?(𝑚) there exists a unique 𝑚 = 𝑚∗ for 
which (i) 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚∗, ?̅?(𝑚∗))  =  0 holds, and (ii) for all 𝑚 ∈ [𝑚∗, 1], we have 𝜕𝐻(𝑎,𝑏,𝑐,𝑚,?̅?(𝑚))𝜕𝑚 >0.  
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Proof.  Define  
                     𝐼(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚)  =  𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, ?̅?(𝑚)) 
Then it can be shown that  
                   𝐼(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) = (2−𝑏)𝑎 + 𝑏𝑚𝑐4  𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚),   
where 
                  𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) =  𝑍1(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) 𝑚2  +  𝑍2(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) 𝑚 + 𝑍3(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) 
and  
                  𝑍1(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐)  =  8𝑏𝑐 − 3𝑏3𝑐 𝑍2(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐)  =  16𝑎 − 16𝑐 − 8𝑎𝑏 +  8𝑏𝑐 − 6𝑎𝑏2 +  4𝑏2𝑐 +  3𝑎𝑏3  − 𝑏3𝑐 
                  𝑍3(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐)  =  𝑎𝑏3  +  2𝑎𝑏2  − 8𝑎𝑏.              
Note that 𝑍1 >  0 for all 𝑏 ∈ (0,1). Further, 
                   𝐼(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚)  =  0   iff  𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚)  =  0 
Then we have, 
(i) 𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 0)  =  −𝑎𝑏(2 − 𝑏)(4 +  𝑏)  <   0 
(ii) 𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 1)  =  4(𝑎 − 𝑐)(4 − 𝑏2)(1 − 𝑏)  >  0, and 
(iii) 𝐽 is strictly convex and quadratic function of 𝑚 with at most two real roots. 
Hence, by intermediate value theorem (IVT), there exists 𝑚 =  𝑚∗ such that 𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚∗)  =  0 
and 𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚)  >  0 for all 𝑚 ∈  (𝑚∗, 1].  Further,  𝜕𝐽𝜕𝑚 > 0 in some neighborhood of 𝑚∗, hence 
the proposition.6                                                                                                                            □                                                                                                                   
 
6 Further note the following. Define 𝑌(𝑏) ∶= 𝑏(4 + 𝑏)(8−3𝑏2) . Then (i) 𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑌(𝑏))  =  −8(1−𝑏)𝑏(2+𝑏)(4+𝑏)( 8−3𝑏2) 𝑐 <  0 and (ii) 𝜕𝐽𝜕𝑚 (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑌(𝑏)) =  [16𝑎 − 8𝑎𝑏 − 6𝑎𝑏2 +  3𝑎𝑏3 − 16𝑐 + 8𝑏𝑐 +  12𝑏2𝑐 + 𝑏3𝑐]  > 0. Hence 𝐽 is increasing in 𝑚 
at least over the interval [𝑌(𝑏), 1]. This also means that 𝑌(𝑏)  < 𝑚∗ < 1. This result will be useful later.           
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Therefore, this proposition proves that in the interval of [0, 1], 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, ?̅?(𝑚)) ><  0 according 
as 𝑚 >< 𝑚∗. Next consider the following proposition.  
Proposition 4: Given any (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐), for all 𝑚 ∈ (𝑚∗, 1) we have, a unique 𝑟 (𝑚) ∈ (c, 𝑟(𝑚))  that 
solves 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  =  0.  
Proof. Let 𝑚 ∈  (𝑚∗, 1). First, note that  𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑐) =  −𝑏𝑐[2(2 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 4𝑚𝑐 +  𝑏𝑐(1 +  𝑚)]                                         =  −𝑏𝑐[2(2 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑚𝑐) +  𝑏𝑐(1 − 𝑚)]  <  0 
And in Proposition 3 it is shown that for all (𝑚∗, 1), 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟(𝑚)) > 0. So, by IVT, there 
exists at least one  𝑟 (𝑚) ∈ (c, 𝑟(𝑚))  that solves  𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  =  0.  
Further note that  𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 0)  >  0. Hence, again by IVT, there exists another 𝑟 (𝑚) ∈ (0, c) 
for which  𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  =  0.  
Since 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟) is a quadratic polynomial of  𝑟, so, there are exactly these two 𝑟 for which 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  =  0 can hold, but one 𝑟 < 𝑐 and the other 𝑟 > 𝑐. Hence, given assumption (A1), 
from now on, by 𝑟 we will always mean  𝑟 > 𝑐.                                                                □                                                                   
We are now in a position to state the basic result of the paper stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 5: Given assumption (A1) and (A2), for all 𝑚 ∈  (𝑚∗ ,1), there exist 𝑟(𝑚) ∈(c, 𝑟(𝑚)) such that for all 𝑟 ∈ (𝑟(𝑚), 𝑟(𝑚)), we must have Π1𝑓 − Π1𝑛 > 0. 
This result simply follows from the results of underlying Propositions 3 and 4. Proposition 5 states 
that, given assumptions (A1) and (A2), in our structure free licensing will occur when  𝑟 belongs 
to an interval and 𝑚 is above a critical level. The reason is that under licensing, firm 1’s operational 
profit always falls. Now, if 𝑚 is very small (that is, technology is much superior), then under 
licensing loss of firm 1’s operational profit will be to the extent that it cannot be outweighed by 
the gain from input sale, if any. On the other hand, if 𝑟 is not sufficiently high, increase in revenue 
from input sale will not be large enough for free licensing to be profitable.  
To facilitate the diagrammatic presentation of the result and to explore the result further, consider 
the following two loci of (𝑚, 𝑟), 
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                     𝜙(𝑚, 𝑟) ≡ ( 𝑟(𝑚) − 𝑟)  =  0                                                                     (10) 
                     𝜓(𝑚, 𝑟) ≡ (Π1𝑓  − Π1𝑛)  =  0                                                                   (11) 
Note that (10) and (11) correspond to the two inequalities (A2) and (9), respectively. Then it can 
be shown (see Appendix 3) that: 
                       [𝜕𝑟(𝑚)𝜕𝑚 ]𝜙(𝑚,𝑟) >  0, and  [𝜕𝑟(𝑚)𝜕𝑚 ]𝜓(𝑚,𝑟)  <  0                                                        (12) 
Therefore, (10) generates an upward sloping locus such that for all (𝑚, 𝑟) below this locus, 
assumption (A2) is satisfied. Similarly, (11) gives a falling locus of (𝑚, 𝑟) such that for all (𝑚, 𝑟), 
condition (9) is satisfied. Hence, the intersection point of these two loci corresponds to the critical  𝑚∗. Then for all values of (𝑚, 𝑟) in the area bounded by these two loci for  𝑚 > 𝑚∗, free licensing 
is profitable. Given the nature of these two loci, it is also clear that as 𝑚 goes up, the interval [𝑟, 𝑟] becomes more widened for 𝑚 ∈ (𝑚∗ , 1). We write the result more formally in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 6:  𝜕(𝑟−𝑟)𝜕𝑚 > 0  for all 𝑚 ∈ (𝑚∗, 1). 
This states that as technological superiority falls, the gap between 𝑟 and 𝑟 increases; this means, 
the possibility of free licensing also increases. The results underlying Propositions 5 and 6 are 
depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Possibility of free licensing, given any (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) 
We may, as well, check the results for the following example. 
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Example 1: Let 𝑎 =  1, 𝑏 =  0.5 and 𝑐 =  0.4. Then 𝑚∗  ≈  0.4745. Hence, we have the 
following results given in Table 1.  
Table 1: Free licensing interval of 𝑟 for any given 𝑚 𝑚 𝑟 𝑟 0.5 0.7858 0.80 0.6 0.7438 0.81 0.7 0.7066 0.82 0.8 0.6733 0.83 0.9 0.6435 0.84 
 
2.4 Comparative Static Analysis 
We now study the effect of the change of 𝑎, 𝑏 or 𝑐 on 𝑚∗ which is solved from 𝐼(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) = 0, 
i.e.  𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚)  =  0. We have the following results. 
Proposition 7: We have  
                                
𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑎 < 0, 𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑏 > 0 and 𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑐 > 0 
Proof is given in Appendix 4. We have the following implications of the above comparative static 
results. Given the parameter vector (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟), let us assume that initially free licensing is 
profitable. This means, given (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐), 𝑚 and 𝑟 are such that they belong to the relevant interval. 
Now suppose that 𝑎 goes up, keeping all the remaining four parameters unchanged. Then the locus 𝜙(𝑚, 𝑟) = 0 shifts up, that is, for every 𝑚, 𝑟 will be higher. Again, when 𝑎 goes up, the locus  𝜓(𝑚, 𝑟) = 0 shifts to the right, implying that for every 𝑚, 𝑟 will be higher.7 But given 𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑎 < 0, 
the cut-off 𝑚∗ will fall, hence the interval of 𝑚 for feasible free licensing goes up. But since 𝑟 goes 
up as a consequence of an increase in 𝑎, the initial (𝑚, 𝑟) may or may not be within the new 
feasible free licensing zone. Therefore, the implication of an increase in market size is that if 
increase in 𝑎 is small, free licensing will continue to be profitable, but if it is large, in the new 
 
7 This follows from the fact that 𝜕𝐻𝜕𝑎 = −[(4 − 𝑏2)(𝑟 − 𝑐)  +  2𝑏𝑟](2 − 𝑏) < 0 and  𝜕𝐻𝜕𝑟 > 0 at some neighborhood of 𝑟. 
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parametric situation, free licensing may not be profitable. The result in Figure 2 shows that given 
an initial parameter vector (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  =  (1.0, 0.5, 0.4, 0.8, 0.75), if 𝑎 goes up to 1.1, free 
licensing continues to be profitable, but for 𝑎 =  1.25, free licensing conditions fail to be satisfied. 
 
Figure 2: Effect of the change of market size on free licensing 
Finally, since 𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑏 > 0 and 𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑐 > 0, therefore when either 𝑏 or 𝑐 alone increases, 𝑚∗goes up; hence 
the possibility of free licensing goes down when either the degree of product differentiation falls 
or the cost of (input) production increases. The reason is that operational profit in either case will 
fall much under licensing, but the corresponding revenue from input sale is unlikely to increase 
sufficiently.   
 
2.5 Implication of Free Licensing to Environmental Problem 
We are now in a position to derive the implication of free licensing in the context of global 
pollution. Let 𝑠0 be the pollution per unit of output generated for using old (backward) technology, 
and 𝑠1 be the same for new or superior technology. It is then reasonable to assume 𝑠0 > 𝑠1 > 0.  
Then total pollution generated from production in the pre-licensing and post- free licensing 
situations will be respectively, 
                             𝐿0  =  𝑠1𝑞1𝑛  +  𝑠0𝑞2𝑛 
                             𝐿1  =  𝑠1𝑞1𝑓  +  𝑠1𝑞2𝑓 
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Then free licensing will reduce global pollution level if and only if  𝐿1 <  𝐿0, that is, [𝑠1𝑞2𝑓 – 𝑠0𝑞2𝑛]  +  𝑠1[𝑞1𝑓  − 𝑞1𝑛]  <  0                                                        (13) 
Since 𝑞2𝑓 > 𝑞2𝑛,  𝑞1𝑓 < 𝑞1𝑛 and 𝑠1 < 𝑠0, therefore the sufficient condition that (13) will be 
satisfied is: 
                    
𝑠0 𝑠1 > 𝑞2𝑓𝑞2𝑛                                                                                                          (14) 
Therefore, (14) requires that 𝑠0 will be sufficiently larger than 𝑠1. Note that 𝑞2𝑓 > 𝑞2𝑛, but under 
free licensing 𝑚 has to be greater than 𝑚∗; hence 𝑞2𝑓 cannot be much larger than 𝑞2𝑛. 
Finally, we conclude this section by noting the welfare implication of our result. Under free 
licensing, each firm’s profit is going up, so industry profit increases. Industry output also increases, 
because 𝑞1𝑓 + 𝑞2𝑓 > 𝑞1𝑛 + 𝑞2𝑛. This means consumers’ surplus also increases unambiguously. 
Moreover, when (14) holds, overall environment becomes less polluted. This, further increases 
welfare. Hence under this situation, the overall welfare under free licensing must increase 
unambiguously. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In the present paper we have studied the possibility of free licensing, and that too without any   
network externality or demand shift effect. We have constructed a differentiated duopoly model 
where the transferred technology reduces the input requirements of the licensee. The licensor also 
sells inputs to the licensee. We have derived conditions under which the revenue from input sales 
outweighs the licensor’s loss of profit from competition. We show that given the market size, the 
degree of product differentiability and the cost of input production, free licensing is profitable 
provided that the transferred technology is not too superior and at the same time the input price at 
which the transferor sells inputs to the transferee is not very low. We have further shown that as 
any of market size, degree of product substitutability and input production cost increases, the 
possibility of free licensing decreases.  
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Finally, we have derived implications of our results to the environmental problem. To the extent 
superior technology generates relatively less pollution, free licensing is likely to reduce global 
pollution. In our paper the overall welfare unambiguously goes up. 
 
Appendix 
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1  
To show that when 𝑏 =  1, there does not exist any tuple (𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟) for which Π1𝑓 >  Π1𝑛 holds, 
first note that the assumption (A2) is reduced to 𝑎 +  𝑚𝑐 >  2𝑟, and  
         𝐻(𝑎, 1, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  = 3(𝑟 − 𝑐)(2𝑟(1 +  𝑚)  −  𝑎 −  𝑚𝑐)  −  𝑟(2𝑎 −  4𝑚𝑐 +  𝑟(1 +  𝑚)). 
Now, 𝐻(𝑎, 1, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟) =  3(𝑟 −  𝑐)(2𝑟(1 +  𝑚)  −  𝑎 −  𝑚𝑐)  −  𝑟(2𝑎 −  4𝑚𝑐 +  𝑟(1 +  𝑚)) <  3(𝑟 −  𝑐)(2𝑟𝑚)  −  𝑟(2𝑎 −  4𝑚𝑐 +  𝑟(1 +  𝑚))  [since  𝑎 +  𝑚𝑐 >  2𝑟] =  𝑟[6(𝑟 −  𝑐)𝑚 − (2𝑎 −  4𝑚𝑐 +  𝑟(1 +  𝑚))] =  𝑟[6𝑟𝑚 −  6𝑚𝑐 −  2𝑎 +  4𝑚𝑐 −  𝑟 −  𝑟𝑚] =  𝑟[5𝑟𝑚 −  2𝑚𝑐 −  2𝑎 −  𝑟] <  𝑟[5𝑟𝑚 −  4𝑟 −  𝑟]           [as 𝑎 +  𝑚𝑐 >  2𝑟] =  −5𝑟2(1 −  𝑚)  <  0 .            □                                                                                                      
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2 
When 𝑏 =  0, the assumption (A2) becomes 𝑎 >  𝑟. Then 𝐻(𝑎, 0, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  =  4(𝑟 −  𝑐)(2𝑟(1 +  𝑚)  −  2𝑎).  
So,  𝐻(𝑎, 0, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  >  0 ⟺ 𝑟(1 +  𝑚)  >  𝑎.       □ 
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Appendix 3: Proof of  [𝜕𝑟(𝑚)𝜕𝑚 ]𝜙(𝑚,𝑟) > 0, and  [𝜕𝑟(𝑚)𝜕𝑚 ]𝜓(𝑚,𝑟) < 0. 
Note that Proof of  [𝜕𝑟(𝑚)𝜕𝑚 ]𝜙(𝑚,𝑟) > 0 follows straight from (10). 
To prove the second part, first note that for any 𝑚 (and given 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑐), 𝑟 is the solution of the 
equation Π1𝑓 −  Π1𝑛 = 0  or,  𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟) = 0. Then,  [𝜕𝑟(𝑚)𝜕𝑚 ]𝜓(𝑚,𝑟) = − [𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝑚⁄𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝑟⁄ ]𝑟=𝑟  
Now, to see the sign of (𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝑚⁄ ), note that 𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝑚⁄ = [2(4 − 𝑏2)(𝑟 − 𝑐) − 𝑏2𝑟]𝑟 + [4𝑟 − (4 − 𝑏2)(𝑟 − 𝑐)]𝑏𝑐  
Now, when 𝑟 = 𝑐, we have (𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝑚⁄ ) = 4𝑏𝑐2 − 𝑏2𝑐2 > 0. Also, 𝜕2𝐻𝜕𝑚𝜕𝑟 > 0.  
So, for all 𝑟 ≥ 𝑐, we have (𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝑚⁄ ) > 0. 
To see the sign of (𝜕𝐻 𝜕𝑟⁄ ) > 0, first note that we can write  𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟) = 𝑆1(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) 𝑟2 + 𝑆2(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) 𝑟 + 𝑆3(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) 
where  
                       𝑆1(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) = (1 + 𝑚)(8 − 3𝑏2) 
                       𝑆2(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) = 4𝑎𝑏2 − (8 − 2𝑏2 + 𝑏3)𝑐𝑚 − (8 − 2𝑏2)𝑐 − 8𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏3     
                       𝑆3(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) = (4𝑏 − 𝑏3)𝑐2𝑚 + (8𝑎 − 4𝑎𝑏 − 2𝑎𝑏2 + 𝑎𝑏3)𝑐 
Then for all 𝑏 ∈ [0, 1] and 𝑚 ∈ [0, 1], we have 𝑆1 > 0, 𝑆2 < 0 and 𝑆3 > 0. 
Since 𝑆1 > 0,  therefore 𝐻 function is strictly convex in 𝑟, given (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚). 
Now consider any 𝑚 ∈  (𝑚∗, 1). In the proof of Proposition 4 we have shown that there exists  𝑟 ∈ (c, 𝑟(𝑚)) such that: 
(i)  𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟)  =  0, 
(ii) 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑐) < 0, and 
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(iii) 𝐻(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚, 𝑟) > 0. 
Therefore, given that 𝐻 is strictly convex and continuous in 𝑟, we must have 𝜕𝐻𝜕𝑟 > 0 at some 
neighborhood of  𝑟. This proves that  [𝜕𝑟(𝑚)𝜕𝑚 ]𝜓(𝑚,𝑟) <  0.    □  
Appendix 4: Proof of  𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑎 < 0, 𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑏 > 0 and 𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑐 > 0   
First note that 𝑚∗ is solved from   
                      𝐼(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) = 0, i.e., from 𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚) = 0 
Now given the expression of 𝐽(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚), we have  
                     𝐽𝑎  =   𝜕𝐽𝜕𝑎  =  − (2 − 𝑏)(3𝑏2𝑚 +  𝑏2  +  4𝑏 −  8𝑚)  
Then 𝐽𝑎 >  0 if and only if 
           
(3𝑏2𝑚 +  𝑏2  +  4𝑏 −  8𝑚) <  0  ⟺  𝑌(𝑏) ≡ 𝑏(4 + 𝑏)(8−3𝑏2)  <  𝑚.  
In Footnote 4 we have already shown that for all 𝑚 ∈ (𝑌(𝑏),1), we have 𝜕𝐽𝜕𝑚 > 0 and 𝑌(𝑏) <𝑚∗ < 1, hence 𝐽𝑎 > 0. Therefore, 𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑎 =  − [ 𝜕𝐽 𝜕𝑎⁄𝜕𝐽 𝜕𝑚⁄ ]𝑚=𝑚∗ < 0 
Again, 𝐽𝑏 =  𝜕𝐽𝜕𝑏 =  𝐽𝑏 = [−9𝑏2𝑐𝑚2 + 8𝑐𝑚2 − 3𝑏2𝑐𝑚 + 8𝑏𝑐𝑚 + 8𝑐𝑚 + 9𝑎𝑏2𝑚 −12𝑎𝑏𝑚 − 8𝑎 + 3𝑎𝑏2 + 4𝑎𝑏 − 8𝑎] 
Note that 
(i) 𝜕𝐽𝑏𝜕𝑎 = [9𝑏2𝑚 − 12𝑏𝑚 + 3𝑏2 + 4𝑏 − 8 − 8𝑚] < 0 for all 𝑏 ∈ [0,1] and 𝑚 ∈ [0,1], and 
(ii) 𝐽𝑏(𝑐, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑚)  =  𝑐 (1 − 𝑚) (9𝑏2𝑚 −  8𝑚 + 3𝑏2 + 4𝑏 − 8) ≤  0 for all 𝑏 ∈ [0,1] and 𝑚 ∈ [0,1]. 
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This means, for all 𝑎 >  𝑐, we have 𝐽𝑏 <  0. 
Therefore, the effect of a change of 𝑏 is:  
  
𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑏 =  − [ 𝜕𝐽 𝜕𝑏⁄𝜕𝐽 𝜕𝑚⁄ ]𝑚=𝑚∗  > 0. 
Finally, note that 𝐽𝑐 = 𝜕𝐽𝜕𝑐 = 𝑚[4𝑏2  +  8𝑏 −  𝑏3  −  16 +  8𝑏𝑚 −  3𝑏3𝑚]= −[(1 − 𝑏)(8 − 𝑏2) + (1 − 𝑏𝑚)(8 − 3𝑏2)] < 0 
Therefore, the effect of a change of 𝑐 is:  
  
𝜕𝑚∗𝜕𝑐 =  − [ 𝜕𝐽 𝜕𝑐⁄𝜕𝐽 𝜕𝑚⁄ ]𝑚=𝑚∗ > 0         □ 
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